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THE LEGALITY OF WASHINGTON SHORELINE 
DEVELOPMENT MORATORIA IN THE WAKE OF 
BIGGERS V. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 
Michelle E. DeLappe 
Abstract: The Washington State Supreme Court struck down the temporary shoreline 
development moratorium at issue in Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 
169 P.3d 14 (2007); yet the court fragmented on the broader question of whether a local 
government has authority to adopt a moratorium on shoreline development during long-term 
land-use planning. In light of upcoming deadlines for the state’s local governments to revise 
their shoreline-management plans, constraints on local authority to adopt shoreline moratoria 
during the planning process take on heightened importance for hundreds of local 
governments. The question highlights the tension between private property rights and 
government authority to regulate for the public welfare. This Note argues that, when 
presented with a reasonable moratorium, Washington courts should deem persuasive the 
agreement of the Biggers’ concurrence and dissent, which form a majority in favor of the 
legality of reasonable moratoria. Biggers provides binding legal precedent pursuant to the 
narrowest-grounds rule for interpreting plurality decisions, holding only that an unreasonable 
shoreline moratorium contravenes Washington law. Courts that adopt this position will 
remain in harmony with the state’s long history of broad local police powers while 
continuing the traditional requirement that land-use ordinances be reasonable. Public policy, 
particularly environmental imperatives, also favors upholding the reasonable shoreline 
moratorium. This Note proposes substantive and procedural factors, applicable in future 
cases, that likely fulfill the reasonableness requirement in Biggers. 
INTRODUCTION 
Puget Sound, a playground for orcas and home to an impressive 
number of species,1 also provides a beautiful place to live for a large and 
rapidly increasing human population.2 In addition to being precious to 
local communities3 and one of the largest estuaries in the United States, 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., PUGET SOUND ACTION TEAM, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF WASHINGTON, 
STATE OF THE SOUND 2007, at 15 (2007), available at http://www.psp.wa.gov/downloads/ 
SOS07/2007_stateofthesound_fulldoc.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law. 
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n1.pdf (“The Puget Sound basin is home to a spectacular 
array of life—200 species of fish, 26 kinds of marine mammals, 100 species of sea birds and 
thousands of invertebrate species such as clams, oysters and shrimp.”). 
2. See id. (“Four million of us make our home here, relying on a healthy Puget Sound ecosystem 
to supply us with water, food and places to live. . . . The projected growth in the region is a 
continuing concern. As many as 1.4 million new residents are expected to move into the region by 
2025.”). 
3. See PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP, SOUND HEALTH, SOUND FUTURE: PROTECTING AND 
RESTORING PUGET SOUND 19–20 (2006), available at http://www.psparchives.com/publications/ 
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Puget Sound is an ecosystem of global significance.4 Today, it faces 
potentially devastating challenges.5 One of the most serious threats 
comes from shoreline development. 
Development that landowners believe will protect their shoreline 
property can harm shoreline habitat: “One-third of the entire Puget 
Sound marine shoreline is already ‘armored’ with rock, cement walls, 
bulkheads, and other hard structures that destroy areas where native 
plants grow, shorebirds hunt for food, forage fish lay eggs, and young 
salmon hide from predators on their way to the sea.”6 Local 
governments’ policies and regulations play a crucial role in preventing 
further habitat loss,7 and measures they take to protect this public 
interest can clash with asserted private property rights.8 Biggers v. City 
                                                     
about_us/psi_reports/final/final/Final_wAPPx_lr.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law. 
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n3.pdf (“Public opinion polling shows that the people who 
live here place a very high value on Puget Sound. . . . People also believe that it is important to 
protect Puget Sound for future generations, to provide habitat for fish and wildlife, and because it is 
good for the economy. . . . However, the majority of residents are not greatly aware of the problems 
facing the Puget Sound region. . . . 97% of the residents of Puget Sound believe that: ‘A healthy 
Puget Sound is a legacy that we must leave to our children and grandchildren.’”). 
4. JOHN LOMBARD, SAVING PUGET SOUND: A CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 21 (2006) (explaining that Puget Sound’s listing on World Wildlife Fund’s catalog of two 
hundred priority ecoregions is due to “two ‘globally outstanding’ ecological phenomena—the 
world’s largest remaining temperate rain forest and some of the world’s largest runs of anadromous 
fish”). 
5. See PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 3, passim (noting, for example, at page 33, that 
over forty species, including salmon and resident orcas, are threatened, endangered, or proposed as 
candidates for listing under the Endangered Species Act, thus indicating that the “overall ecosystem 
is stressed”). This year’s loss of seven Puget Sound orcas (out of a pod of ninety) underscores the 
ongoing ecological problems. See Lynda V. Mapes, 7 Orcas, Regular Visitors to Sound, Likely 
Dead, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/nationworld/2008309284_orcas25m.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law. 
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n5a.pdf; Robert McClure, Are the Orcas Starving?: As 
Salmon Runs Decline, Killer Whale Numbers Take Hardest Hit Since 1990s, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 24, 2008, at A1, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/ 
384854_orcas25.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev67n5b.pdf. 
6. PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 43; see also id. at 14 (“Puget Sound has already 
lost an astonishing 80% of its estuary habitat.”); id. app. B, at 15 (describing the restorative 
softening of private shorelines as “a particular challenge and a significant opportunity for a 
sustainable Puget Sound” and recommending restrictions on construction of new bulkheads). 
7. See id. at 44 (explaining local governments’ role as an important actor in protecting habitat and 
adding that preventing habitat loss is more cost-effective than attempts at restoration or clean-up). 
8. See, e.g., LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 93–103 (summarizing the historical evolution of private 
property rights in the context of limits in favor of the public-welfare regulations and proposing 
possible “compensation to landowners hardest hit” by Puget Sound ecosystem management); 
Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Notice and Expectation Under Bounded Uncertainty: Defining Evolving 
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of Bainbridge Island9 involved just such a conflict, as local property 
owners and builders took issue with a particular kind of ordinance: the 
temporary moratorium, which is a tool for long-term planning that has 
sparked disparate reactions from courts across the nation.10 
In Biggers, the Supreme Court of Washington sided with the property 
owners, ruling that the City of Bainbridge Island’s moratorium was 
unlawful. The court failed, however, to reach a consensus on the 
circumstances under which a local government has the authority to adopt 
a temporary moratorium on shoreline development. Four justices argued 
that the Washington Constitution bars local governments from enacting 
shoreline moratoria under all circumstances;11 four justices agreed with 
the City that the authority exists under Washington law and that the 
City’s temporary moratorium was reasonable;12 and one justice, in a 
concurring opinion ruling against the City, agreed with the dissent that 
local governments have the authority to enact reasonable moratoria but 
determined that the moratorium at issue was unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional.13 
The court’s fragmentation makes it difficult to ascertain the holding 
and precedential value of the decision.14 This area of law demands 
clarity because of the important interests at stake. The interests include 
the protection of Puget Sound ecology, the need for stability in the 
                                                     
Property Rights Boundaries Through Public Trust and Takings, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 233 (2008) 
(discussing the national, historical, and philosophical debate on private property rights and public 
regulation in land-use planning); Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, Public and Private Property Rights: 
Regulatory and Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 
422–23 (2005) (noting that the conflict between private and public rights derives from the tension 
between two attitudes toward land—as a resource for human consumption or as a part of an active 
and interconnected ecological system). 
9. 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007). 
10. See PATRICIA E. SALKIN, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.24 n.6 and 
accompanying text (5th ed. 2008); see generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (rejecting the claim that two temporary moratoria, which 
amounted to a thirty-two-month ban on development in high-hazard areas while the planning 
agency created a regional plan to protect the clarity of Lake Tahoe’s waters, resulted in a per se 
unconstitutional taking); Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 707–08, 169 P.3d at 28 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) 
(listing authorities that recognize moratoria as “valid tools for local government to forestall filing of 
permit applications when amending land use regulations,” and also noting a minority position that 
demands “express authority to adopt moratoria”). 
11. See Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 685–702, 169 P.3d at 17–25. 
12. See id. at 706–16, 169 P.3d at 27–32 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). 
13. See id. at 702–07, 169 P.3d at 25–27 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
14. The fragmentation may be further complicated by the subsequent retirement of Justice Bridge, 
who supported the lead opinion. 
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planning process, the costliness of litigation and liability for local 
governments,15 owners’ rights to use their land, and pressures to develop 
land in order to accommodate the region’s growing population. 
Some legal commentators, looking only to the lead opinion and 
ignoring the fact that five justices agreed that local governments have 
the authority to enact reasonable moratoria, have erroneously concluded 
that the decision prohibits all local shoreline moratoria.16 This Note 
                                                     
15. See Rachel La Corte, Court Tosses Bainbridge Shoreline Ordinance, but Justices Say Cities 
Have Right to Moratoriums, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 12, 2007, at B3, available at 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/335195_shorelines12.html, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n15a.pdf (quoting an attorney for the 
Building Industry Association of Washington: “If I were a city or county government, I wouldn’t 
want to risk millions of dollars and attorneys fees fighting this in court”); Rachel Pritchett & Chris 
Dunagan, Bainbridge Council Decides to Pay Attorney Fees, BAINBRIDGE ISLANDER, Oct. 25, 
2007. available at http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2007/oct/25/bainbridge-council-decides-to-pay-
attorney-fees, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev67n15b.pdf (reporting the city council’s decision to pay the Biggerses’ attorney fees, 
amounting to approximately $75,000).  
16. See SALKIN, supra note 10, at § 6:28 n.1 (stating only the lead opinion’s reasoning in its 
summary that the case “str[uck] down a municipal moratorium on shoreline development in part 
because the state Shoreline Management Act contained no provision authorizing local governments 
to adopt moratoria and because the Act required municipalities to have methods to achieve effective 
and timely protection for shoreline landowners, thus showing that the city’s moratorium prohibited 
what was permitted under state law”). The prior edition of this treatise also ignored the concurring 
and dissenting opinions. See PATRICIA E. SALKIN, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2:9 
n.8 (4th ed.) (“The Supreme Court of Washington held [in Biggers] that neither the state 
constitution nor the Shoreline Management Act authorizes municipalities to impose shoreline 
development moratoria.”); Mun. Research & Servs. Ctr. of Wash., Washington State Court 
Decisions Affecting Cities, Towns and Counties, http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Legal/decs.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2008), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
notes/84washlrev67n16a.pdf (a local reference often used by practitioners) (citing the holding as 
consisting of the conclusions of the lead opinion, while ignoring the concurring and dissenting 
opinions). Local media have also privileged the lead opinion’s analysis when describing the case’s 
holding. For example, one prominent local newspaper reported that “in the high court’s majority, 
Justice James Johnson wrote that authority to halt shoreline development under the 1971 Shoreline 
Management Act resides solely with the state.” Illegal for Bainbridge Island to Halt Shore 
Development, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at B5, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/localnews/2003944253_dige12m.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law. 
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n16b.pdf. While this news article also summarized the 
concurrence and stated there was a dissent by four justices, it did not subsequently clarify this 
supposed “majority” position. See id. But see Rachel La Corte, supra note 15 (explaining that 
“[f]ive of the nine justices held Thursday that cities have the authority to impose such 
moratoriums,” although Justice Chambers concurred in striking down “Bainbridge Island’s freeze 
[as] not reasonable”). A law firm representing the plaintiffs likewise attached little importance to the 
majority of the justices in Biggers in its celebratory report on the case. See Davis Wright Tremaine 
LLP, Bainbridge Island Couple Wins Case Before Washington State Supreme Court, PACIFIC RIM 
ADVISORY COUNCIL NOVEMBER 2007 E-BULLETIN 8, http://www.prac.org/materials/ 
2007_November_eBulletin.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
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argues that courts should interpret Biggers as affirming a local 
government’s power to enact reasonable moratoria. When read 
according to the narrowest-grounds rule for interpreting plurality 
decisions,17 Biggers provides binding precedent for invalidating only an 
unreasonable shoreline moratorium. While courts should, of course, 
invalidate unreasonable moratoria, they should uphold reasonable 
moratoria as consistent with Washington’s long history of vesting broad 
police powers in local governments so long as their regulations are local, 
reasonable, and not in conflict with general law.18 
Part I of this Note introduces the constitutional and statutory law 
underlying the Biggers opinions, which involves the extent of local 
police powers in Washington, the state’s interest in its shorelines, and 
interaction between the Shoreline Management Act19 and the Growth 
Management Act.20 Part II summarizes the court’s three opinions in 
Biggers. Part III explains how Washington courts interpret plurality 
holdings and argues that the concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Biggers are persuasive authority for upholding reasonable shoreline 
moratoria. Part IV argues that courts should uphold reasonable moratoria 
because they are an important tool for protecting sensitive areas while 
local governments engage in long-term planning. Part IV also introduces 
factors Washington courts will likely apply in determining whether a 
particular moratorium is reasonable. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAWS BOTH GRANT 
AND LIMIT LOCAL POWERS 
The state’s constitutional and statutory laws involving the power of 
local governments over shorelines are central to understanding Biggers. 
Most important is the extent of local regulatory power under article XI, 
section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Second, there is the question 
                                                     
wlr/notes/84washlrev67n16c.pdf (quoting counsel for the Building Industry Association of 
Washington: “The Court was absolutely correct in ruling that neither the laws of Washington nor 
the constitution grant local governments the authority to impose blanket building moratoria on 
shorelines”; also noting that the full ramifications of the decision were not clear). 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See e.g., Ventenbergs v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 2d 92, 101–02, 178 P.3d 960, 965 (2008) 
(reaffirming municipalities’ broad police powers when exercised reasonably). See generally Hugh 
D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495 (2000) (reviewing 
the history of local police power in the state). 
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008). 
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58 (2008). 
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of special limits to local power for shorelines, pursuant to the public-
trust doctrine and state dominion of shorelines under article XVII, 
section 1 of the Washington Constitution. Finally, the Washington State 
Legislature has delegated specific regulatory duties to local governments 
through the Shoreline Management Act (SMA) and the Growth 
Management Act (GMA), but the interaction of these two statutes has 
created some confusion with respect to shoreline areas. 
1. The State Constitution Grants Local Governments Regulatory 
Powers 
Article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution empowers 
“[a]ny county, city, town or township [to] make and enforce within its 
limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in 
conflict with general laws.”21 Adopted in 1889, when the “Dillon Rule” 
was in vogue nationally as limiting local government to only those 
powers expressly granted or necessarily implied,22 the broad language of 
section 11 amounted to an express grant of power to local 
governments.23 
Throughout the state’s history, Washington courts have generally held 
that local governments have broad powers to enact reasonable 
regulations to promote the public welfare. Cases decided soon after the 
adoption of section 11 interpreted municipal police powers as equal 
within their local sphere to those enjoyed by the State Legislature.24 For 
example, one early ruling upheld a municipality’s authority to ban 
business solicitation of disembarking train passengers against the 
railway company’s challenge.25 Although Washington courts briefly 
                                                     
21. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
22. John F. Dillon, a nineteenth-century judge as well as a railroad corporate lawyer, advocated 
strong limits to protect private property from municipal regulation. See JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 25 (1872) (“No small proportion of corruption and 
abuse in municipalities has had its source in their authority to make public and local improvements. 
The power is usually conferred without sufficient care, and the rights of the property owners (often 
made liable for the whole cost of the improvement or amount of the expenditure) not sufficiently 
respected or guarded.”); HENRY W. SCOTT, DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN LAWYERS, WITH THEIR 
STRUGGLES AND TRIUMPHS IN THE FORUM 302–03 (1891); see also Spitzer, supra note 18, at 498 
(“Nationally, late nineteenth century municipal powers were constrained by the ‘Dillon Rule.’”). 
23. Spitzer, supra note 18, at 498. 
24. See id. 
25. See City of Seattle v. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424, 97 P. 454 (1908). Other early examples of a broad 
approach to local police powers include Smith v. City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 219, 104 P. 249 (1909) 
(upholding garbage regulations that put an existing enterprise out of business) and Shepard v. City 
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followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead in Lochner v. New York26 during 
the early 1900s and struck down labor and economic regulations as 
illegitimate uses of police powers, they did so “in a limited fashion and 
only when constrained to do so by the facts.”27 The demise of the 
Lochner era28 ended Washington’s foray into liberty-of-contract limits 
on local police powers, and “[s]ince the 1930s, the Supreme Court of 
Washington has generally continued the strong-police-power approach 
that it had begun in the late nineteenth century.”29 
Washington courts today do not generally require an explicit 
constitutional grant of local police power.30 Instead, they rely on a 
judicially established test to ensure that local governments do not 
overstep their constitutional authority: the regulations must be (1) 
reasonable, (2) local in nature, and (3) not in conflict with general 
laws.31 
2. The State Constitution, Consistent with Public-Trust Principles, 
Requires that the State Retain Its Interest in Shorelines 
Ancient in origin, the public-trust doctrine vests states with the duty 
to hold certain resources in trust for public use.32 Under this doctrine, 
                                                     
of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 P. 1067 (1910) (upholding a city requirement that private hospitals 
and sanatoria connect to public sewers). 
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
27. Spitzer, supra note 18, at 500–02 (summarizing Washington decisions involving plumbers’ 
licenses, the horseshoeing business, and meatpacking plants’ closing hours, among other issues). 
28. The Washington Supreme Court helped end Lochner-era limits on local police powers by 
upholding a state minimum-wage law despite directly adverse U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See 
Parrish v. W. Coast Hotel, 185 Wash. 581, 55 P.2d 1083 (1936), aff’d, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). 
29. Spitzer, supra note 18, at 505. 
30. Id. at 506. 
31. Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wash.2d 144, 159, 459 P.2d 937, 945 (1969) (“We have 
frequently held that Const. art. 11, § 11, is a direct delegation of the police power to cities and 
counties, and that the power delegated is as extensive within their sphere as that possessed by the 
legislature. The only limitations upon municipal exercises of the police power are that the subject 
matter must be local and that the regulation must be reasonable and not conflict with general 
laws.”); Spitzer, supra note 18, at 506 (“Despite the strong nature and expanding scope of the police 
power, the Supreme Court of Washington has consistently limited the power’s exercise by its 
definition of the police power and by the inherent limits of regulatory authority—not on an 
explicitly constitutional basis.”). See also Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 
330–31, 787 P.2d 907, 912–13 (1990) (adapting a modified version of the reasonableness test to the 
modern land-use context). 
32. See Kleinsasser, supra note 8, at 423–24 (summarizing the doctrine’s origins in Roman law 
and English common law); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (holding 
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“partially encapsulated”33 in article XVII, section 1 of the state 
constitution, Washington retains an interest in all tidelands in the state,34 
even though approximately seventy-three percent of Puget Sound 
shoreline is in private hands.35 The doctrine subjects the state’s “power 
to dispose of, and invest individuals with, ownership of tidelands and 
shorelands” to public-trust principles,36 which can encompass 
environmental conservation and shoreline management.37 
3.  The Shoreline Management Act Protects Shorelines, and the 
Growth Management Act Protects Critical Areas 
The Shoreline Management Act, passed by the Legislature in 1971 
and adopted by public referendum the following year, made Washington 
one of the first states to introduce a statutory scheme guiding long-term 
plans for the protection of shorelines.38 The legislative findings of the 
SMA note that “the shorelines of the state are among the most valuable 
and fragile of its natural resources,” resulting in a state policy of 
                                                     
that a state cannot irrevocably relinquish its interest in navigable waters and the land underneath 
because it holds it “in trust for the people of the state”). 
33. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (1993). 
34. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (“The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and 
shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in 
waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within 
the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes . . . .”). 
35. See Ewa M. Davison, Comment, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public 
Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813, 
814–15 (2006) (citing THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, PUGET SOUND SHORELINE STRATEGY: A 
CONSERVATION VISION FOR PUGET SOUND 14 (2005), http://www.tpl.org/content_documents/ 
puget_sound_shoreline_screen.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev67n35.pdf). 
36. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 667, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987). 
37. See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management 
in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 574, 578 (1992) (noting the public-trust interest in 
preserving the environmental integrity of trust resources and recognizing regulation under the SMA 
and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) as forms of comprehensive planning that “bear 
directly on preserving elements of the public trust”); Kleinsasser, supra note 8, at 426–27 (“Because 
the public trust doctrine is infused with communal obligations—and therefore implicates the 
relationship between the public and the public’s use and enjoyment of its land—it has been used by 
many states to buttress environmental protection regulations.”). 
38. See Washington State Department of Ecology, “Introduction to Washington’s Shoreline 
Management Act (RCW 90.58),” Ecology Publ’n 99-113 (2003), available at http://www.ecy. 
wa.gov/pubs/99113.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
notes/84washlrev67n38.pdf. In recent years, all states with coastal and wetland areas have increased 
regulation of development to protect the ecological balance of shorelines. SALKIN (4th ed.), supra 
note 16, at § 2:9. 
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“protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its 
vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic 
life.”39 The SMA instructs local governments to prioritize, in order, 
shoreline uses that: 
(1) Recognize and protect the statewide interest over local 
interest; 
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline; 
(3) Result in long term over short term benefit; 
(4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline; 
(5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the 
shorelines; 
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the 
shoreline; 
(7) Provide for any other element as defined in [the SMA] 
deemed appropriate or necessary.40 
The SMA also recognizes limited shoreline-development needs: 
“Alterations of the natural condition of the shorelines of the state, in 
those limited instances when authorized, shall be given priority for 
single family residences and their appurtenant structures . . . .”41 The 
statute also grants priority to several other types of developments 
“dependent on their location on or use of the shorelines of the state.”42 
The stated objective is to “provide an opportunity for substantial 
numbers of the people to enjoy the shorelines of the state.”43  
The SMA operates under a centralized approach: the Department of 
Ecology issues rules and guidelines that local governments use to create 
local Shoreline Master Programs (SMPs) that are in turn subject to the 
review and approval of the Department of Ecology.44 
The Legislature passed the Growth Management Act (GMA), in two 
bills in 1990 and 1991, because of pressure from voters concerned about 
the effects of sprawl, infrastructure costs for new development, and 
                                                     
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (2008). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. §§ 90.58.050–090; see also Henry W. McGee, Washington’s Way: Dispersed 
Enforcement of Growth Management Controls and the Crucial Role of NGOs, 31 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2008). 
DELAPPE FEB2009.DOC 3/8/2009  12:18 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:67, 2009 
76 
growth impacts on natural resources in the Puget Sound region.45 The 
GMA has turned out to be one of the most important laws for 
environmental conservation in the Puget Sound,46 despite pursuing 
competing goals: local governments are directed both to conserve habitat 
and promote development.47 
The GMA set up a decentralized system whereby local governments 
enact comprehensive plans, delineate urban growth areas, and determine 
critical areas where ecological functions should be preserved or 
enhanced.48 It requires “the best available science in developing policies 
and development regulations to protect the functions and values of 
critical areas,”49 which is a more stringent requirement than the SMA’s 
instruction that local governments research and conduct studies “to the 
extent feasible.”50 The mandate to protect critical areas and to use the 
best available science makes the GMA a more potent tool than the SMA 
for protecting ecologically fragile areas, despite the GMA’s limited view 
of ecosystems as small elements of the landscape instead of as regional 
and interconnected.51 
The Legislature failed to explain whether shorelines governed by the 
SMA are also subject to the additional GMA requirements, i.e., whether 
the two statutes overlap. State agencies charged with administering the 
SMA and providing guidance under the GMA have interpreted the 
statutes as operating together in shoreline areas, with GMA provisions 
                                                     
45. See LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 213; WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CMTY., TRADE & ECON. DEV., 
CREATING LIVABLE COMMUNITIES: MANAGING WASHINGTON’S GROWTH FOR 15 YEARS 4–9 
(2006), available at http://cted.wa.gov/_CTED/documents/ID_3175_Publications.pdf, permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n45.pdf (discussing the 
social, environmental, and other conditions that brought about Washington’s Growth Management 
Act); McGee, supra note 44, at 1–2. 
46. See LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 209 (“It is the primary reason the region has decreased its per 
capita consumption of land and increased protections for important fish and wildlife habitats since 
the early 1990s.”). 
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(9)–(10) (2008); see LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 209 
(pointing out that the GMA does not acknowledge that its “mandates cannot be accomplished 
together”). 
48. See McGee, supra note 44, at 8; Douglas R. Porter, State Framework Laws for Guiding 
Urban Growth and Conservation in the United States, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 547, 556 (1996). 
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.172(1) (2008). 
50. See id. § 90.58.100(1). 
51. See id. § 36.70A.030(5) (2008); see also LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 240 (noting that the 
“GMA currently defines critical areas at too small a scale” for keeping human uses “consistent with 
ecological goals for the land”). 
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applying whenever they do not conflict with SMA provisions.52 The 
Washington State Supreme Court recently split on the issue of SMA-
GMA interaction in a four-to-four-to-one decision, in which one justice 
joined the plurality only in the result but did not contribute a separate 
opinion.53 The lead opinion declared that GMA requirements for critical 
areas do not apply to shoreline management under the SMA.54 The 
dissent responded by quoting a provision from the SMA stating that the 
part of an SMP governing critical areas shall “provide protection that is 
at least equal to that provided by the local government’s critical areas 
ordinances” adopted pursuant to the GMA.55 With neither analysis 
backed by a majority, SMA-GMA interaction in critical shoreline areas 
remains an open question. 
While both the SMA and GMA prioritize environmental protection, 
they coexist uneasily in a tangle of the state’s constitutional law, 
statutes, and regulations that local governments, courts, and agencies 
struggle to tame. Disagreement in Biggers as to the protections available 
to critical shoreline areas stems partly from this underlying confusion. 
II. BIGGERS PRODUCED THREE OPINIONS ON THE VALIDITY 
OF A LOCAL SHORELINE MORATORIUM 
The issue before the state’s highest court in Biggers was whether 
Washington law allows a municipality to adopt a temporary shoreline 
moratorium. The court drew heavily on the areas of constitutional and 
statutory law summarized above to determine whether any shoreline 
moratoria would be reasonable, and it relied on factual considerations in 
deciding whether the particular moratorium was reasonable. 
                                                     
52. Brief of Amici Curiae Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology and Wash. State Dep’t of Cmty., Trade 
& Econ. Dev., Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007) (No. 
77150-2) 2006 WL 937646, at *11–15 (“The GMA further emphasizes that shoreline master 
programs are not the exclusive means of regulating developments in shoreline jurisdiction. Under 
the GMA, shoreline master programs are an element of the local comprehensive plan, and shoreline 
regulations are considered development regulations.”). 
53. See Futurewise v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 164 Wash. 2d 242, 189 P.3d 161 
(2008). Justice J.M. Johnson authored the lead opinion and was joined by Justices C.W. Johnson, 
Sanders, and Bridge (serving as Justice Pro Tem.). Justice Madsen concurred with the lead in the 
result only. Justice Chambers wrote the dissent and was joined by Chief Justice Alexander and 
Justices Owens and Fairhurst. See id. 
54. See id. at 245, 189 P.3d at 162. 
55. Id. at 250–51, 189 P.3d at 165 (Chambers, J., dissenting); see also WASH. REV. CODE 
90.58.090(4). 
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The lead opinion, which garnered four votes, contended that the City 
overstepped its power under the Washington Constitution. The dissent, 
supported by an equal number of justices, deemed the power to 
implement a moratorium to be inherent among the broad local powers 
provided under the state’s constitution. The dissent also defended the 
City’s moratorium as reasonable. The tie-breaking concurrence 
explicitly agreed with the dissent’s legal analysis but found the 
moratorium unreasonable, thus joining the lead in holding that the City’s 
moratorium was unconstitutional. 
1.  Three Successive Moratorium Ordinances Ignited a Controversy 
The City of Bainbridge Island, with approximately forty-eight miles 
of Puget Sound shoreline, adopted an ordinance in August 2001 placing 
a one-year moratorium on the filing of “new applications for shoreline 
substantial development permits, shoreline substantial development 
exemptions and shoreline conditional use permits.”56 The ordinance 
allowed applications for normal maintenance and repair as well as for 
emergency repair.57 The City stated that the moratorium was necessary 
while the City studied the environmental impacts of shoreline 
development for long-term plans pursuant to the Legislature’s 
requirement that approximately two hundred and fifty cities and counties 
develop or amend their SMPs within the next few years.58 The City 
passed the temporary moratorium to prevent environmental damage 
while it collected the scientific information for revising its SMP, “during 
which time significant shoreline habitat that supports a species 
threatened with extinction could be lost or damaged” if development 
continued.59 The ordinance cited two provisions of the GMA as authority 
for the temporary moratorium.60 
                                                     
56. City of Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2001-34 (Aug. 29, 2001), available at 
http://www.ci.bainbridge-isl.wa.us/documents/2001-34_Shoreline_Moratorium.pdf, permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n56.pdf; Biggers v. City 
of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d. 683, 688, 169 P.3d 14, 18 (2007). 
57. See Ordinance 2001-34, supra note 56. 
58. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.080(2) (2008) (providing deadlines for when each local 
government must finish developing or amending its SMP); Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 686–87, 169 
P.3d at 17; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology and Wash. State Dep’t of 
Cmty., Trade & Econ. Dev., Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (No. 77150-2), 2006 WL 
937646, at *1 n.1. 
59. Ordinance 2001-34, supra note 56; Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 688, 169 P.3d at 18; see id. at 
709, 169 P.3d at 28 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). 
60. See Ordinance 2001-34, supra note 56 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.63.220 and WASH. 
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In accordance with the ordinance and the cited statutory provisions, 
the City held a public hearing in October 2001 to review findings.61 The 
hearing resulted in Ordinance 2001-45, limiting the scope of the original 
ordinance to “new overwater structures (piers, docks and floats) and new 
shoreline armoring (bulkheads and revetments) where none ha[d] 
previously existed.”62 The ordinance included the City Council’s 
findings, “[b]ased on the public testimony and other evidence submitted 
at the public hearing,” that these structures could significantly impact 
shoreline habitat.63 
The ordinance apparently prevented Bainbridge Island residents Ray 
and Julie Biggers from replacing a bulkhead associated with their 
home.64 Joined by the owners of bulkhead and construction businesses,65 
the Biggerses asked the Kitsap County Superior Court for a judgment 
declaring the moratorium illegal and void.66 They contended that the 
moratorium (1) violated the Washington Constitution’s police-powers 
provision by conflicting with the laws of the state; (2) misplaced 
authority under the GMA not applicable to shorelines; (3) was passed for 
“impermissible purposes”; and (4) resulted in an invalid amendment to 
the City’s SMP.67 
In August 2002, another Bainbridge Island public hearing resulted in 
Ordinance 2002-29, extending the moratorium for seven months.68 In the 
meantime, the trial court issued a summary-judgment order ruling that 
                                                     
REV. CODE § 36.70A.390). 
61. See City of Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2001-45 (Oct. 17, 2001), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n61.pdf. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. § 1 (including among the findings the listing of the Puget Sound Chinook Salmon as a 
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service’s 
ruling designating estuarine areas accessible to the species as “critical habitat,” the City’s resolution 
recognizing critical habitat within its jurisdiction, and the damage shoreline structures pose to 
salmon habitat because “changing beach substrate and elevation . . . can negatively effect [sic] 
juvenile salmon migratory patterns” and “remov[ing] riparian and overhanging vegetation can cause 
changes in microclimate and water quality, . . . impact[ing] the food web critical to salmonids”). 
64. See Rachel La Corte, supra note 15 (reporting information provided by the Biggerses’ 
lawyer). 
65. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 862–63, 103 P.3d 244, 245–46 
(2004), aff’d, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007). 
66. See Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 689, 169 P.3d at 18 (lead opinion). 
67. Id. at 689, 169 P.3d at 18–19. 
68. See City of Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2002-29 § 2 (Aug. 21, 2002), permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n68.pdf (extending the 
moratorium to Mar. 1, 2003). 
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the City lacked authority to implement a shoreline moratorium.69 While 
the case was on appeal, the City passed Ordinance 2003-34, extending 
the moratorium an additional year, but narrowing it to docks and piers in 
Blakely Harbor.70 
Meanwhile, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, 
declaring that GMA moratorium procedures did not apply to shorelines 
and that “the SMA trumps the GMA” in governing “the unique criteria 
for shoreline development.”71 The Washington State Supreme Court 
granted the City’s petition for review, prompting briefs from business 
associations in support of the Biggers and from state agencies, 
Snohomish County, and environmental groups in support of the City, 
reflecting what one observer called “the cacophonous meta-debate over 
private property rights and environmental protection in Washington.”72 
2.  The Lead Opinion Declared All Shoreline Moratoria 
Unconstitutional in Washington 
Justice J.M. Johnson, joined by Chief Justice Alexander and Justices 
Sanders and Bridge, declared the moratorium unconstitutional. The lead 
justices concluded that the moratorium violated the Washington 
Constitution’s police-powers provision because the City’s ordinances 
conflicted with the state constitution’s declaration of state interest in 
                                                     
69. See Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 690, 169 P.3d at 19. 
70. See City of Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2003-34 (Sept. 3, 2003), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n70a.pdf. Blakely Harbor has 
been of special concern in protecting habitat because, with 3.5 miles of shoreline, it is “the last 
harbor within Central Puget Sound that remains largely undeveloped with docks.” CITY OF 
BAINBRIDGE ISLAND, 2006 BLAKELY HARBOR DOCK SHORELINE AMENDMENT FACT SHEET (Aug. 
2006), available at http://www.ci.bainbridge-isl.wa.us/documents/Blakely_Dock_Fact_Sheet_ 
Aug2006.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev67n70b.pdf. 
71. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 865–67, 103 P.3d 244, 247–49 
(2004), aff’d, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007). 
72. Ryan M. Carson, Note, Chinks in the Armor: Municipal Authority to Enact Shoreline Permit 
Moratoria After Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2008) 
(“The identity of other interested parties in this case should not go without comment. On one side 
are the plaintiff respondents, who are private property owners, joined by local construction industry 
interests. On the other side is a small municipality. As the case moved towards the Washington 
Supreme Court, each side’s list of friends grew. The Building Industry Association of Washington, 
Washington Association of Realtors, and Pacific Legal Foundation filed amicus briefs on behalf of 
the property owners. Washington Environmental Council, Futurewise, People for Puget Sound, 
various state agencies, and Snohomish County filed amicus briefs on behalf of the city.”). 
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shorelines.73 Submitting that “local governments have no broad police 
power over shorelines” because of state ownership of shorelines 
pursuant to the public-trust doctrine and article XVII, section 1 of the 
Washington Constitution,74 the lead opinion argued that unless state laws 
expressly delegated the power to institute a shoreline moratorium, no 
local authority could exist:75 “[L]ocal governments possess only those 
powers expressly delegated or found by necessary implication,” with any 
doubts resolved “against local government and against the claimed 
power[.]”76 
Turning to the SMA and GMA, the lead opinion concluded that 
neither law empowered a municipality to adopt shoreline moratoria. The 
opinion described the SMA as embodying “a legislatively-determined 
and voter-approved balance between protection of state shorelines and 
development”77 that does not expressly empower local governments to 
enact moratoria. The lead opinion focused on an SMA provision for 
protecting single-family residences from erosion.78 Accordingly, this 
provision concerning erosion meant the City’s moratorium “prohibit[ed] 
what state law permits,” thus constituting a second conflict with the 
state’s general laws.79 Justice J.M. Johnson also attacked the City’s 
reliance on amendments to the GMA regarding adoption of moratoria, 
noting that the Legislature, in adding these provisions to the GMA and 
other statutes in 1992, had excluded the SMA.80 He concluded that GMA 
provisions did not authorize the City’s moratorium because, “[a]lthough 
the GMA frequently mentions shoreline master programs, the GMA 
could not alter the provisions of the SMA without express 
amendment.”81 
                                                     
73. Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 688, 709, 169 P.3d at 18, 25 (citing WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11 and 
art. XVII, § 1). 
74. Id. at 694–95, 169 P.3d at 21–22. 
75. See id. at 695–96, 169 P.3d at 22. 
76. Id. at 699, 169 P.3d at 23. Because of its broad language about express delegation and 
necessary implication, one commentator has interpreted the Biggers lead opinion as resurrecting the 
Dillon Rule. See 1 M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 1:02 
n.2 (Supp. 2008). 
77. Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 697, 169 P.3d at 22. 
78. See id. at 698, 169 P.3d at 23 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 98.58.020). 
79. Id. (emphasis in original). 
80. See id. at 699–700, 169 P.3d at 24. 
81. Id. at 701, 169 P.3d at 24. 
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Having chastised the City for its “adoption of rolling moratoria, 
which imposed a multi-year freeze on private property development in 
shoreline areas,” the lead opinion voiced concern about “leav[ing] all 
shoreline property defenseless against erosion.”82 The opinion also 
deplored the City’s procrastinating in fulfilling its planning duties.83 
3.  The Dissenting Opinion Deemed the Shoreline Moratorium 
Constitutional 
Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justices C. Johnson, Owens, and Madsen, 
concluded in dissent that the Washington Constitution grants local 
governments the authority to institute shoreline moratoria.84 “Contrary to 
the lead opinion’s assertions,” the dissent argued, “the legislature may 
exercise the regulatory authority arising out of its sovereignty over state 
shorelines through a state agency or a local subdivision of state 
government without violating the public trust doctrine” and the 
Washington Constitution’s declaration of state ownership of 
shorelines.85 
The dissent determined that the City also enjoyed statutory authority 
to pass the moratorium. The City’s authority to administer permits under 
the SMA necessarily implied “authority to defer acceptance of permit 
applications as it deems necessary to ensure compliance with the 
SMA.”86 Obtaining scientific information for a revised SMP was 
consistent with the SMA’s ecological priorities.87 As “only a temporary 
suspension of established regulations,” the moratorium did not 
contradict shoreline regulations.88 Furthermore, the dissent disagreed 
with the lead opinion’s characterization of the Legislature’s 1992 
amendments, arguing that the added moratoria provisions “did not 
contain express grants of authority to adopt moratoria—rather, it 
impose[d] limitations on existing powers to adopt moratoria.”89 
                                                     
82. Id. at 685–86, 169 P.3d at 17. Erosion in this area can be caused by seasonal storms, ferry 
wake, and removal of vegetation. See, e.g., Kucera v. State, 140 Wash. 2d 200, 995 P.2d 63 (2000) 
(involving claims that high-speed ferries caused shoreline erosion). 
83. Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 685–86, 169 P.3d at 17. 
84. See id. at 706–07, 169 P.3d at 27 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. at 713–14, 169 P.3d at 30–31. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. at 709, 169 P.3d at 28; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (2008), quoted supra 
notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
88. Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 709, 169 P.3d at 28. 
89. Id. at 709–10, 169 P.3d at 29 (“A county or city governing body that adopts a 
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The dissent found that this particular moratorium was a legitimate 
exercise of the City’s police powers because it promoted the public 
interest by preventing overdevelopment of the shoreline during the 
planning process.90 The moratorium was reasonable because it allowed 
permits for single-family residences and their normal appurtenances and 
only delayed “review of proposals to construct protective bulkheads and 
private docks—it did not prohibit them in violation of the SMA.”91 
4. The Concurring Opinion Concluded that the City’s Particular 
Moratorium Was Unreasonable and Thus Unconstitutional 
Justice Chambers’ concurring opinion generally agreed with the 
dissent’s legal analysis.92 Interpreting article XI, section 11 as a “broad 
delegation of police power to the local governments,” he agreed with the 
dissent that the appropriate test under the Washington Constitution’s 
police-powers provision is “if (1) the matter is local and the use (2) is 
not in conflict with the general laws and (3) is reasonable.”93 
He also rejected the lead opinion’s conclusion that the State alone can 
regulate the shoreline under the state constitution’s public-trust 
provision. Declaring that the “power to regulate does not ride like a 
parasite on the State’s title to some of the lands in the state,”94 the 
concurring opinion discussed local shoreline regulation as part of the 
“sharing of police power” that is “a foundational principle of our 
State.”95 Justice Chambers deemed the power to implement a 
moratorium as consistent with the statute as well. His analysis 
emphasized the SMA goals of protecting vegetation, wildlife, waters, 
and aquatic life.96 His conclusion that the Washington Constitution 
                                                     
moratorium . . . without holding a public hearing on the proposed moratorium . . . shall hold a 
public hearing on the adopted moratorium . . . within at least sixty days of its adoption”) (quoting 
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.390) (all emphases and ellipses in opinion). 
90. See id. at 712, 169 P.3d at 30. 
91. Id. 
92. See id. at 703, 169 P.3d at 25 (Chambers, J., concurring in the result). 
93. Id. at 705, 169 P.3d at 25, 27 (adopting the reasonableness test employed in Weden v. San 
Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 692, 958 P.2d 273, 280 (1998)). 
94. Id. at 704, 169 P.3d at 26. 
95. Id. at 705, 169 P.3d at 26 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58, which “establishes a cooperative 
program of shoreline management between local government and the state,” and Hugh D. Spitzer, 
Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495, 497–98 (2000)). 
96. See id. at 704, 169 P.3d at 26 (quoting Buechel v. Dep’t of Ecology, 125 Wash. 2d 196, 203, 
884 P.2d 910, 915 (1994)). 
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grants municipalities “independent authority” to manage shorelines as 
long as not in conflict with the SMA led to his agreement with the 
dissent that shoreline moratoria pose no such conflict.97 
The concurring opinion concluded, however, that the City’s 
moratorium failed to satisfy the reasonableness requirement.98 Justice 
Chambers took issue with the City’s decision to extend the moratorium: 
“[I]t is arrogant, high handed, and beyond the pale of any constitutional 
authority for a stagnant government to deny its citizens the enjoyment of 
their land by refusing to accept building permits year after year based on 
a ‘rolling’ moratorium.”99 According to the concurrence, the City’s 
repeated extensions rendered the moratorium unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional.100 
By joining the lead opinion in the judgment against the City, Justice 
Chambers determined the case’s outcome; however, he rejected the lead 
opinion’s stance on the relevant law, instead “largely agree[ing] with 
Justice Fairhurst’s analysis of the law applicable to this case.”101 Part III 
argues that this concurring opinion holds the key to the proper 
interpretation of Biggers’ holding. 
III.  BIGGERS PROVIDES PERSUASIVE PRECEDENT FOR 
UPHOLDING REASONABLE SHORELINE MORATORIA 
Under the narrowest-grounds rule,102 Biggers held that the particular 
moratorium at issue was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. 
The concurring opinion rejected the lead’s constitutional and statutory 
analysis, however, and expressly embraced the dissent’s. As a result, 
five justices agreed that a municipality possesses authority to adopt a 
temporary shoreline moratorium that is local in scope and reasonable in 
purpose and implementation. Washington courts apply the narrowest-
                                                     
97. Id. at 706, 169 P.3d at 27. 
98. See id. 
99. Id. 
100. See id. at 703, 169 P.3d at 25. 
101. Id. 
102. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))) 
(emphasis added). 
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grounds rule to discern what portion of the plurality opinion is binding 
precedent.103 
In Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy 
Committee,104 the Washington State Supreme Court analyzed another 
four-to-four-to-one decision. In Southcenter, the court recognized the 
agreement between the concurring and dissenting opinions as the 
majority stance. Washington courts should treat Biggers similarly, thus 
recognizing local governments’ authority to enact reasonable moratoria 
on shoreline development. 
In Southcenter, the court held that the Washington Constitution’s 
free-speech provision105 is triggered only by state action and does not 
prevent owners from expelling individuals from their private property.106 
The court squared this holding with its prior decision in Alderwood 
Associates v. Washington Environmental Council,107 which had also 
produced three opinions, mirroring the type of fragmentation in Biggers. 
In Alderwood, the court had held that a large shopping mall may not 
exclude citizens gathering signatures for an initiative.108 Justice Utter, 
joined by three other justices, wrote a lead opinion that would have 
broadly held that the shopping mall owner must respect a group’s right 
to free speech.109 Four dissenting justices argued that the Washington 
Constitution protects speech only against the state and not against 
private parties.110 A lone justice concurred in the judgment but grounded 
his analysis in the Washington Constitution’s initiative provision, and 
explicitly rejected the lead opinion’s free-speech analysis.111 
Because the Southcenter plaintiffs were soliciting contributions and 
distributing literature instead of collecting signatures for an initiative, the 
court described its holding as consistent with the Alderwood decision.112 
                                                     
103. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 137 Wash. 2d 580, 593–94, 973 P.2d 
1011, 1017 (1999) (holding that a five-member decision, formed by the lead and concurring 
opinions, controlled on the narrow issue decided according to principles of stare decisis). 
104. 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989). 
105. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
106. See Southcenter, 113 Wash. 2d at 419, 780 P.2d at 1285. 
107. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). 
108. See id. at 232–53, 635 P.2d at 110–21 (lead and concurring opinions). 
109. See id. at 232–47, 635 P.2d at 110–18 (lead opinion). 
110. See id. at 253–55, 635 P.2d at 121 (Stafford, J., dissenting). 
111. See id. at 247–53, 635 P.2d at 118–21 (Dolliver, J., concurring in result). 
112. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 427, 
780 P.2d 1282, 1289–90 (1989). 
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The court distilled Alderwood as holding “simply that people have a 
right under the initiative provision of the Constitution of the State of 
Washington to solicit signatures for an initiative in a manner that does 
not violate or unreasonably restrict the rights of private property 
owners.”113 This distillation abides by the narrowest-grounds rule, which 
states that “[w]here there is no majority agreement as to the rationale for 
a decision, the holding of the court is the position taken by those 
concurring on the narrowest grounds.” 114 
The court in Southcenter went beyond extracting the narrow holding 
of the plurality decision in Alderwood. The court also looked to the five-
justice majority formed by the Alderwood dissent and concurrence and 
pointed out that “a 5-member majority of this court rejected the 
argument now posited by the ND-PC that the free speech provision of 
our state constitution does not require ‘state action.’”115 The agreement 
of five members of the bench, even when comprising the dissenting and 
concurring opinions, constitutes persuasive authority. 
With few exceptions, Washington has adopted the narrowest-grounds 
rule.116 The rule’s application to Biggers signifies that the lead opinion 
                                                     
113. See id. at 428–29, 780 P.2d at 1290. 
114. Davidson v. Hensen, 135 Wash. 2d 112, 128, 954 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1998). 
115. Southcenter, 113 Wash. 2d at 428, 780 P.2d at 1290 (emphasis in original). 
116. See, e.g., Davidson, 135 Wash. 2d at 128, 954 P.2d at 1335 (citing several cases from 
Washington); State v. Zakel, 61 Wash. App. 805, 808–09, 812 P.2d 512, 514 (1991) (citing Marks, 
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), aff’d, 119 Wash. 2d 563, 834 P.2d 1064 (1992); State v. Dunbar, 59 
Wash. App. 447, 453, 798 P.2d 306, 310 (1990) (citing Southcenter, 113 Wash. 2d at 427–28, 780 
P.2d at 1289); Zueger v. Public Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Snohomish County, 57 Wash. App. 584, 591, 
789 P.2d 326, 329 (1990) (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988), 
for the same rule). Although two recent Washington cases, In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 
P.3d 390, 393 (2004), and Wright v. Terrell, 135 Wash. App. 722, 735, 145 P.3d 1230, 1238 (2006), 
rev’d, 162 Wash. 2d 192, 170 P.3d 570 (2007), depart from this rule by according plurality opinions 
no binding power, their departure appears based on a misreading of Zueger found in State v. 
Gonzalez, 77 Wash. App. 479, 891 P.2d 743 (1995). Other decisions citing Zueger report that “the 
position taken by those concurring on the narrowest grounds” is binding. Davidson, 135 Wash. 2d at 
128, 954 P.2d at 1335 (citing Zakel, 61 Wash. App. at 808–09, 812 P.2d at 514). In Gonzalez, the 
court likely focused too eagerly on a slight vacillation after the clear assertion of the narrowest-
grounds rule in Zueger: “When no rationale for a decision of an appellate court receives a clear 
majority the holding of the court is the position taken by those concurring on the narrowest grounds. 
Following this principle, if Herskovits stands for anything beyond its result, we believe the plurality 
represents the law . . . .” Zueger, 57 Wash. App. at 591, 789 P.2d at 329 (citations omitted). In 
reviewing Wright v. Terrell, the Washington Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred by 
rejecting as nonbinding the point agreed upon by lead and concurring opinions. See Wright v. 
Terrell, 162 Wash. 2d 192, 195–96, 170 P.3d 570, 571 (2007). The court in Wright avoided taking a 
clear stand on the narrowest-grounds rule by concluding that the precedent at issue, consisting of 
opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, did not amount to a plurality decision with 
respect to the point concurred upon. See id. at 195, 170 P.3d at 571. 
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has no binding legacy because only four justices accepted its 
constitutional and statutory interpretation. While the lead opinion 
broadly stated that local governments lack authority to enact moratoria 
on shoreline development, Justice Chambers concurred only that the 
City’s particular moratorium was unreasonable.117 Those who have 
understood the decision as barring all moratoria on shoreline 
development are mistaken.118 
When interpreted according to the analysis that the Southcenter court 
applied to Alderwood, the Biggers dissent and concurrence stand for the 
proposition that the Washington Constitution vests authority in local 
governments to enact all reasonable moratoria that are local in nature 
and not in conflict with the general laws. Part IV argues that courts 
should interpret Biggers in precisely this way because of pressing 
environmental concerns that a temporary moratorium is uniquely able to 
address. Additionally, Part IV suggests several factors Washington 
courts will likely weigh when determining whether a particular 
moratorium is reasonable. 
IV. A COMBINATION OF FACTORS MAKES A MORATORIUM 
REASONABLE 
Courts in Washington and elsewhere have acknowledged the 
moratorium’s utility as a planning tool, recognizing that were it not for 
moratoria, developers could push through projects before regulations are 
adopted and undermine the new plan by increasing nonconforming 
uses.119 In addition to causing damage that new regulations were 
designed to prevent, nonconforming uses and ongoing development 
hinder analysis of current problems. In the case of development that 
threatens a region already under severe environmental stress, the gap 
between planning and adopting the new plan would likely result in 
                                                     
117. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 703, 169 P.3d 14, 25 (2007) 
(Chambers, J., concurring). 
118. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
119. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
337–38 (2002) (noting that “the consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria, 
or ‘interim development controls’ as they are often called, are an essential tool of successful 
development” because, “[t]o the extent that communities are forced to abandon using moratoria, 
landowners will have incentives to develop their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can 
be enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived growth”); SALKIN, supra note 10, at § 
6.24 (discussing the advantages of using moratoria for planning and the dangers of a “rush” on 
development during the period of planning). 
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irreversible damage.120 To avoid these problems, most states, including 
Washington, have generally upheld the use of a moratorium as part of 
local zoning power.121 
Washington’s vesting rules increase the importance of moratoria. 
Washington freezes laws applicable to development upon application for 
a building permit, which is “earlier in the process than any other state in 
the country.”122 This early vesting “virtually invites subversion of the 
public interest,”123 interests that include public services, aesthetic values, 
historical character, rural traditions, and other features of a community 
that may be threatened by development.124 Owners and developers can 
“frustrate effective long-term planning” under early vesting rules 
because they generally need not conform to restrictions on development 
enacted after the filing of an application for a development project.125 
Washington’s vesting rules thus create “intractable planning problems” 
and “a patchwork quilt of legal, nonconforming uses . . . antithetical to 
sound land use planning.”126 The moratorium, on the other hand, is a 
                                                     
120. Cf. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 307–08 (describing “Lake Tahoe’s exceptional clarity” and its rapid 
deterioration due to “[t]he upsurge of development in the area”; also noting that the increase in 
impervious surfaces leads to erosion and “‘increased nutrient loading of the lake,’” and “‘unless the 
process is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its trademark blue color, becoming green and 
opaque for eternity’” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 
F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999)). 
121. See, e.g., Jablinske v. Snohomish County, 28 Wash. App. 848, 852, 626 P.2d 543, 545 
(1981) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting residential development for one year near a planned 
airport expansion, without public notice or hearing, was “a true interim measure” within the 
County’s authority); see also DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 485 (2d ed. 2004) (“Most courts . . . find that the general authorization to 
adopt zoning ordinances includes the power to adopt moratoria.”). 
122. LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 230; see SELMI, supra note 121, at 127 (reviewing vesting rules 
in the various states and noting that Washington has “refused to follow the general rule that building 
permits are not protected against revocation by subsequent zoning change,” and instead follows 
Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958) (“[T]he right vests when the 
party . . . applies for his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued.”)). 
123. LOMBARD, supra note 4, at 230 (quoting RICHARD SETTLE ET AL., WASHINGTON LAND USE 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1983)). 
124. See Brief of the States of Vermont, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1597741, at *5–8 
[hereinafter Brief of the States] (providing examples of harm caused by development). 
125. Jablinske, 28 Wash. App. at 851, 626 P.2d at 545. 
126. Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 287, 943 P.2d 1378, 1388 (1997) 
(Talmadge, J., concurring). 
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simple and effective planning device127 that allows a local government to 
gather scientific information and public input while preventing the 
vesting of land-use rights that would disrupt the community’s 
environmental goals. 
Washington lacks, however, a clear definition of what makes a 
moratorium reasonable.128 The court’s assessment of the moratorium in 
Biggers points to duration, diligence, purpose, and procedure as key 
indicators of reasonableness. 
Duration is crucial because moratoria rely on their temporary, short-
term, interim, or emergency status for their validity.129 The Biggers 
concurrence declared that “a reasonable moratorium must be in place no 
longer than necessary to accomplish the necessary planning by a body 
exercising diligence to accomplish that planning. Then, the moratorium 
must be removed.”130 Although no clearly acceptable duration emerges 
from Biggers, Washington courts would likely accept twelve months as 
reasonable in most cases, considering the time-consuming tasks required 
by proper planning.131 Long-term shoreline planning often requires 
scientifically analyzing complex environmental problems, gathering 
public input, and waiting for the Department of Ecology’s approval of 
the SMP.132 The Biggers concurrence’s criticisms of the City’s “refusing 
to accept building permits year after year”133 might indicate a per se rule 
that three years exceeds the reasonable duration of a temporary 
moratorium in Washington. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also spoken on the issue of duration, 
stating in dictum that “[i]t may well be true that any moratorium that 
                                                     
127. See SELMI, supra note 121, at 481 (“The moratorium is the simplest kind of growth control 
device.”); see also SALKIN, supra note 10, at § 6.24 (listing alternative devices, such as 
administrative delay or overly restrictive interim ordinances, and their shortcomings). 
128. Indeed, Washington participated in an amicus brief that argued that the reasonableness of 
temporary moratoria depends upon a fact-specific inquiry with multiple factors, not upon 
categorical rules. Brief of the States, supra note 124, at *13–14. 
129. See, e.g., Jablinske, 28 Wash. App. at 852, 626 P.2d at 545 (emphasizing “emergency,” 
“interim,” and “temporary” aspects of a twelve-month moratorium). 
130. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 704, 169 P.3d 14, 26 (2007) 
(Chambers, J., concurring). 
131. See SALKIN, supra note 10, at § 6.24 (“It is not uncommon for it to take one to three years to 
complete the essential studies and develop a comprehensive plan. More time is then needed to draft 
ordinances and regulations, conduct public hearings, and finally to adopt and publish such 
ordinances and regulations.”). 
132. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.090–90.58.100 (2008). 
133. Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 706, 169 P.3d at 27. 
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lasts for more than one year should be viewed with special 
skepticism.”134 Nonetheless, the Court rejected under the Federal 
Constitution any categorical rule on duration out of concern that 
“creat[ing] added pressure on decisionmakers to reach a quick resolution 
of land-use questions . . . would only serve to disadvantage those 
landowners and interest groups who are not as organized or familiar with 
the planning process.”135 Most state laws specifying moratoria durations 
vary from six to thirty-two months.136 In those states where legislatures 
are silent on this question, courts usually settle on limits in 
approximately the same range, taking into account the complexity of the 
planning tasks and the “good faith and reasonable speed and efficiency” 
with which government addresses its tasks.137 
Diligence is the next key indicator of reasonableness. Local 
governments should compile and retain documentation of every action 
taken in pursuing the planning process before and during a moratorium. 
A detailed work plan explaining why it is necessary to freeze 
development would build a record that demonstrates—through concrete 
goals, tasks, and deadlines—that the moratorium is neither “rolling” nor 
a sign of “stagnant” government.138 Local governments should also 
anticipate possible delay in agency review and approval, and retain all 
communication with the Department of Ecology. Whenever a local 
government extends a moratorium, it should clearly explain the reasons 
for the extension and communicate expected SMP approval dates. 
The moratorium’s purpose, as articulated in the ordinance, must be 
legitimate and grounded in the public welfare. Moratoria that include 
factual findings of the dangers presented by ongoing development and 
address those threats in a reasonable manner will satisfy this 
requirement. The moratorium at issue in Biggers most likely satisfied 
this requirement because it discussed the impacts of specific types of 
                                                     
134. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341 (2002). 
135. Id. at 340–41. 
136. See SALKIN, supra note 10, at § 6.24 (referring to CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65858 (2007), COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 30-28-121 (2007), and WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7) (2007), among others). See also Brief of 
the States, supra note 124, at *12–13 (citing statutory limits of six months to two-and-a-half years 
in support of the argument that “[t]emporary moratoria are already subject to reasonable limitations 
that protect property owners”). 
137. Wincamp P’ship, OTC v. Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009, 1030 (D. Md. 1978); 
see also SALKIN, supra note 10, at § 6.24 (discussing additional state-court decisions on moratoria 
with varying circumstances and durations). 
138. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 706, 169 P.3d 14, 27 (2007) 
(Chambers, J., concurring) (criticizing the City’s conduct). 
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structures for certain species in distinct areas, and it limited the 
moratorium’s scope to the listed types of structures.139 
As a final factor, procedural safeguards must also be respected. GMA 
provisions already spell out procedures for adoption of moratoria, such 
as public notice and hearing requirements.140 These procedures apply 
equally well to shoreline management moratoria. 
In direct response to the Biggers decision,141 the Washington State 
Legislature considered, but did not enact, a bill during the 2008 
legislative session that would have amended the SMA to explicitly 
empower local governments to enact temporary moratoria.142 The 
proposed bill’s requirements provided guidelines similar to those 
advocated in this Note. The bill would have allowed local shoreline 
moratoria to be effective for six months and renewed repeatedly 
following procedural safeguards.143 If the bill becomes law, Washington 
courts would still likely be called upon to determine whether a given 
moratorium satisfies the requirement that it be “necessary and 
appropriate” for implementation of the SMA.144 This inquiry would be 
virtually identical to the fact-intensive reasonableness inquiry that 
Biggers requires courts to conduct. Because long-term land-use planning 
presents too many variables to make any bright-line limit suitable for all 
circumstances, leaving this inquiry to courts is appropriate; Washington 
courts, having conducted this type of case-by-case reasonableness 
inquiry to evaluate local governments’ regulations since voters ratified 
the state’s constitution in 1889, are uniquely qualified to do so. 
                                                     
139. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
140. See Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 709–10, 169 P.3d at 29 (2007) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) 
(citing the GMA moratorium provision requiring public hearings and other procedures). 
141. See WASH. STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OFFICE OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 2535, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., at 2 (2008), 
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/ 
2535.HBA%2008.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev67n141.pdf. 
142 . See  H.B.  2535,  60 th  Leg . ,  2008 Reg.  Sess .  (Wash.  2008) ,  avai lable  a t 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2535-S.pdf, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev69n142a.pdf; 
S.H.B. 2535, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/ 
documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2535-S.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev67n142b.pdf.  
143. See S.H.B. 2535(3). 
144. S.H.B. 2535(1). 
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CONCLUSION 
Recognizing the importance of creating stability in shoreline planning 
and the role of reasonable moratoria in protecting Puget Sound, this Note 
attempts to clarify the confusion surrounding Biggers’ holding. The 
thicket of Washington’s land-use statutes contributes to the court’s 
fragmentation and to general confusion in this area of law.145 
Nevertheless, in Biggers’ wake, a reasonable moratorium should survive 
judicial scrutiny. Local governments must take steps to ensure that their 
moratoria are reasonable, and courts should evaluate reasonableness by 
applying a case-by-case analysis based on the factors presented in this 
Note. 
 
                                                     
145. See, e.g., Futurewise v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 164 Wash. 2d 242, 248, 189 
P.3d 161, 164 (2008) (Chambers, J., dissenting) (“Admittedly, harmonizing the SMA and the GMA 
is a challenge, both for local governments and this court.”); Biggers, 162 Wash. 2d at 702, 169 P.3d 
at 25 (Chambers, J., concurring) (referring to the “desperate need” to streamline land-use law). 
